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Abstract
This article explores the potential effects of retirement on mental health and
health care utilisation isolating sources of potential heterogeneity in treatment ef-
fect. To estimate the effects of retirement, we devise a new identifying strategy that
combines kink and regression discontinuity designs with panel data methods. Our
method is then applied to the British Household Panel Survey, a rich representative
longitudinal survey. It is found that retirement has a small impact on primary care
use, but overall has little effect on mental health.
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1 Introduction.
The causal effect that retirement might have on health and health care is a topic of
considerable interest, not only for economists, but also for legislators, due to the poten-
tial consequences on public finance and the welfare system. Before the proliferation of
debates and policies affecting the delay of the default retirement age, there has been a
trend towards early retirement, especially in OECD countries. Several of the key ex-
plaining such a trend have been identified, among which special prominence has been
given to the implicit disincentives faced by workers concerning retirement age (Krueger
and Pischke, 1992, Blundell et al., 2002, Gruber and Wise, 2002, 2004), the disadvan-
tage faced by older workers during industrial restructuring and periods of technological
change (Banks and Smith, 2006), as well as the impact of an ageing population. The
trend has been exacerbated by a rise in the age at which people leave school (Banks and
Smith, 2006) and its ultimate consequence has been a rise in the ratio of retirees per
person of working age. The implications are well known: in pay-as-you-go systems it
can compromise the solvency of pensions and welfare funds, while in the context of fully
funded systems, a too high proportion of retirees would affect the amount of savings
available for investment and, therefore, economic growth.
To counter balance the negative effects of retirement dynamics, policy makers in
developed countries are now debating or implementing increases in the retirement age
and the age at which people are eligible for pensions. Most policies that have been put
forward contemplate increases of one to two years in the default retirement age, which
constitutes a 2.5 % - 5% increase in a working life of 40 years. However, it has been
argued that retirement might affect health, in which case the valuation of policies that
prolong retirement should account for such an effect. In the presence of health effects,
a longer retirement horizon, by postponing changes in health outcomes, could affect the
utilization of health services by older adults (conditional on life expectancy), and this
would impact on any projected variation in health care expenditures.
When it comes to unveiling any causal relations between retirement and health,
economic theory can often be inconclusive as pointed out by Dhaval et al. (2008). These
authors outline that, in accordance with the Grossman model (Grossman, 1972), if
the marginal value of time increases after retirement, individuals will increase their
expenditure in preventive health care because of the consumption value of health but,
simultaneously, this effect might be mitigated by the fact that the cost of visiting a
medical practice or health provider increases. Therefore, there is a need for empirical
studies to articulate the potential relationship between retirement and health.
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In practice, selection bias complicates the identification of the effect of retirement
on health and practitioners have addressed this problem using a variety of instrumental
variable strategies. However existing results tend to be contradictory, even after taking
into account the potential endogeneity of retirement. Seminal work by Charles (2004)
concludes that the “... direct effect of retirement on well-being is positive once the
fact that retirement and well being are simultaneously determined is accounted for...”.
Dhaval et al. (2008) finding that retirement leads to a 6-9% decrease in mental health,
and a 5-6% increase in illness conditions. Coe and Lindeboom (2008) conclude that
there are no negative health effects of retirement. Neuman (2008) finds that there
is strong evidence dismissing the idea that retirement harms health, while Johnston
and Lee (2009) conclude that retirement improves individuals’ sense of well-being and
mental health, but not necessarily physical health. In this article we present further
evidence regarding the causal effect of retirement on health introducing a number of
methodological novelties.
The focus of this article is mental health and utilisation of health services. The focus
on mental health is justified because, as suggested by medical and sociological research,
mental health is potentially the most vulnerable dimension of a person’s health upon
retirement. Retirement may imply a loss for the employee, but it may also signify a relief
from strenuous conditions. Either effect is likely to manifest in a change mental fitness.
Our study tries to take into account that retirement is likely to have heterogeneous
effects. Previous research by Gruber and Wise (2002),Gruber and Wise (2004) and
Banks and Smith (2006) suggests that there are different experiences of retirement, and
in line with these results we try to isolate different sources of heterogeneity. In particular
we pay special attention to education, occupation and job satisfaction.
Finally, our identification strategy is also new. It is well know that, in the United
Kingdom, the conditional distribution of retirement on age exhibits a discontinuity at
the, recently changed, default retirement age (DRA) of 65 (for men). For instance,
Blundell et al. (2002), Smith (2006), Banks and Smith (2006) report 20%-25% jumps in
the proportion of retirees at that age. Johnston and Lee (2009) exploit this feature1 us-
ing regression discontinuity (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960, van der Klaauw, 1996,
Hahn et al., 1999), using an indicator of exceeding the default retirement age as an
instrument. We build upon this approach, but we introduce two methodological innova-
tions. Firstly, we note that the distribution of retirees exhibits a second feature, namely
1It is convenient to remark that Johnston and Lee (2009) use the Health Survey for England, a
repeated cross-section, and the reported jump in their work greatly exceeds the 20/25% gap typically
reported in most studies.
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there is a kink at the default retirement age. The rate of retirees grows fast before
the default retirement age, but this rate slows down considerably afterwards. Following
recent work by Card et al. (2009) and Dong (2011) we exploit this discontinuity in the
density function of retirement in order to produce an additional set of instruments, which
allows us to add identification power to our estimator, as well as circumvent potential
weak instrumental variable (IV) problems. Secondly, when panel data are available,
it is a wide-spread practice to take the average cluster approach described in Lemieux
and Milligan (2008), Battistin et al. (2009), or Dong (2011). However, as pointed out
recently by Petterson-Lidbom (forthcoming), one can exploit the two stage least square
interpretation of discontinuity designs (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) and combine the dis-
continuity approach with standard I.V. panel methods. This has the advantage that
comparisons are drawn between the same individual at consecutive points in time (right
before and right after the DRA), making it less contentious to use the main assumptions
underpinning nonparametric discontinuity techniques, namely comparability of distribu-
tions around the threshold and continuity of potential outcomes. One of the important
implications of this is that the choice of bandwidth, though important, becomes a less
critical aspect of this work.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 revisits the relationship between
retirement and health, explaining the challenges faced when estimating causal effects. We
outline some of the mechanisms through which retirement can affect health and comment
on important sources of heterogeneity in outcomes. Section 3 introduces the econometric
methodology, providing an overview of existing discontinuity designs. Section 4 describes
the data and present the main results, while section 5 concludes.
2 Health and Retirement.
Labour supply outcomes and health status are simultaneously determined. Health is a
form of human capital valued by employer and employee alike. People invest in health to
alter the depreciation of health capital, but this requires time and income. Employees’
preferences between work and leisure may change following variations in health status
while, at the same time, health status can affect the time horizon over which labour de-
cisions are taken. Furthermore, labour market activity may affect health through stress,
working conditions, boredom or even complacency... This intricate set of relationships
greatly complicates the estimation of the causal effect of health on labour supply (and
vice versa).
Further complications are faced when studying the retirement decisions of older work-
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ers, not only because the correlation between health and employment status intensifies
around retirement (with health becoming a major reason to retire, as has been pointed
out by Disney et al., 2006), but also due to the nature of the data normally available
(Stern, 1989, Bound, 1991). Survey data often only contains self-reported indicators of
health, which are imperfect representations of actual health status2. These indicators
are also subject to measurement error because a person’s perceptions of his own health
status is often not directly comparable with those of other individuals (see, Bound, 1991
or Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2002). Furthermore, respondents may rationalise their re-
tirement decisions, given that health is one of the few reasons why a person of working
age might be out of work and early retirement benefits might be available only for those
deemed incapable of work. When the emphasis of the research is, as in this article, the
effect of retirement on health, comparability of outcomes and the relevance of measures
of health remain an issue in so far as one needs to interpret what the dependent vari-
able is actually capturing. However, retirement status is normally well approximated by
survey data, conditional on the researchers’ definition of retirement3.
Retirement can affect health through a number of mechanisms. A more well known
argument suggests that, upon retirement people’s consumption patterns might be af-
fected if retirement implies an unexpected negative shock in a person’s wealth (thus
violating the conditions of life-cycle models that support the idea of smooth consump-
tion pathways over a life time). In that case, individuals might lower their intake of food
or, perhaps more likely, they might change the quality of their diets so that the intake of,
for example, saturated fats is increased. For example, ready meals, diary and red meat
are more readily available, and generally cheaper, than whole grain food, vegetables or
fish. However the former are worse nutritional packages than the latter, and can have
dramatic short term effects on health markers such as cholesterol levels -see Hu et al.
(1997) or Willett (1998). The effect of retirement on consumption has been the object of
a wealth of research, but evidence is mixed (see, for instance, Banks et al., 1998, Smith,
2004, Smith, 2006, Hurst, 2008, Haider and Stephens, 2007, Battistin et al., 2009). In
terms of food preparation and quality of food intake Aguiar and Hurst (2005) find that
retirement is innocuous, although some evidence exists that contradicts this as well (see
Brzozowski and Lu, 2010).
2Even when objective measures are available, one must ensure that these are actually related to
labour supply
3When the emphasis of the research is the causal effect of health on retirement, the above problems
are particularly relevant. Researchers have devised different strategies to tackle some of the problems,
including instrumental variable approaches (as in Stern, 1989, Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2002, Smith,
2006, Disney et al., 2006) and simultaneous equation models (Sickles and Taubman, 1986, Sickles and
Yazbeck, 1998, Cai, 2010, Bound et al., 2010).
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A second argument, which is the first focus of this article, emphasises the impact of
retirement on mental health. Medical and sociological research has argued that mental
health is the most vulnerable dimension of a person’s health upon retirement. The so
called role theory would play a major role to explain this line of causality. As noted in
Kim and Moen, 2002, role theory conjectures that people who have retired from their
careers are vulnerable to feeling a role loss, which could lead to psychological distress.
Clearly, the contrary could be true: retirement from demanding roles might lead to an
improvement of mental well-being. Either way, mental health scales would become the
relevant variables when studying the potential health-impact of retirement. Any other
variable that might indicate a deterioration (or improvement) of mental health would
be useful to evaluate this theory. For instance, recent medical research suggests that
high blood pressure and migraine are highly correlated with poor mental health (Ahn
and Ashizawa, 2010, Stam et al., 2010). Some of these measures have the advantage of
being relatively more objective than self-reported mental health -in particular, medical
examination is normally required prior to knowing if one has high blood pressure.
Whatever mechanism might explain any causality of retirement on mental health,
economists and policy makers are ultimately interested in the effects that changes in
health status can have on the demand for health care, and therefore the question needs
to be asked concerning whether individuals’ utilisation of health care changes upon
retirement. Clearly, if retirement affects any dimension of health, survey data would
reflect a variation in patterns of utilisation. However, utilisation and need for health care
need not go hand-in-hand, especially when considering primary care (to which individuals
normally self-refer). Individuals might have incentives or contractual advantages during
their working lives that promote absenteeism, part of which can be rationalised through
consumption of medical care. Statutory or occupational sick leave and sick pay can
create these type of incentives, especially when the monitoring of absenteeism in the
firm is not strict. Another reason can be found in the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of
efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). These authors propose a model by which
efficiency wages4 exceed the pure competition market rate. The excess payment increases
with the employees’ cost of effort, the ease of finding a job if fired and the rate at which
worker’s discount future utility, and decreases as the probability of detecting shirking
in the firm increases. Even in firms tightly control the health and health care of their
employees, once the decision of retirement has been taken the consequences of getting
caught shirking might become mild or disappear altogether, in which case shirking might
increase just before retirement, to drop again after leaving the work force. Therefore,
4Firms pay efficiency wages when the unit wage elasticity of employees’ effort equals one.
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the second focus of this article will be whether utilisation of health care changes upon
retirement.
2.1 Heterogeneous effects.
As pointed out in Blundell et al. (2002), Gruber and Wise (2002, 2004) and Banks and
Smith (2006), there are very different experiences of retirement, and different groups of
the population are likely to behave differently when leaving paid employment perma-
nently. The defining features of each of these groups are elusive. This article explores
the effect of three potential sources of heterogeneity.
In accordance with human capital theories, a person’s schooling decisions maximise
the present value of lifetime earnings. The higher the rate of discount, the less likely
a worker will invest in education, as they discount heavily the receipt of future income
generated by further education. Fuchs (1982) suggests that differences in time prefer-
ences are established early in life and remain relatively stable, which suggests that these
discount rates will still be high upon retirement. In accordance with Grossman (1972),
health promoting activities have a consumption and an investment dimension, the later
due in part to the ability of health to generate future income by enabling a person to
work. Individuals about to retire might postpone health care utilization if that might
incur foregone income or opportunity costs. However, this effect would be more evident
among the population of people that discount income at a higher rate. In practice,
discount rates are unobservable but in view of the relationship between discounting and
educational attainment, people with similar level of schooling will be relatively homo-
geneous in terms of discount rates. Therefore, level of schooling can be used to identify
how individuals trade health for income around retirement.
Education also determines, to a certain degree, people’s skill mix and later occupa-
tion in life. A number of recent articles (see Autor et al., 2003, Acemoglu and Autor,
2011 and references therein) have noted that occupational mix can explain evolution of
wage differentials via, for example, the introduction of new technologies and off-shoring,
both of which can depress returns to certain tasks while boosting returns to others.
For instance, Firpo et al. (2011) take the example of debugging and updating software.
Consider a country with a group of firms producing software. The firms can subcontract
debugging and updating its software overseas, where it can be completed promptly and
cheaply. This frees time for the firms’ own programmers to concentrate on developing
new applications, thus boosting their productivity. However, off-shoring will depress
returns to debugging, and increase returns for developers in the country were the firm
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is located. This channel can further induce different retirement patterns among occupa-
tions, an argument that is implicit in (Banks and Smith, 2006), when they mention the
disadvantage of older workers during industrial restructuring and technological change
as a potential determinant of retirement. People are endowed with heterogeneous mixes
of skills, but the argument could be made that people self-select into occupations as
to maximise their returns given their knowledge about their own mix of skills. This
would result in specific occupations having workers with similar social, emotional or
even physical abilities, so that common patterns of reaction to retirement might arise in
such occupations5. Therefore, this article explores the causal relationship of retirement
on health by occupational groups.
The last source of heterogeneity that we consider in this article is job satisfaction.
Bad contractual arrangements or a destructive work environment are likely to affect, not
only productivity, but also staff moral and sense of well-being at work so that retirement
can relieve workers from an activity that could be seen as a burden. Alternatively, people
might enjoy a healthy, enriching working environment; their job satisfaction might be
high and they might develop an attachment for their posts, in which case retirement
might lead to a sense of loss of welfare with consequences for individual’s moral. If
any of these pathways is dominant, one would observe that retirement alters mental
health, and so it becomes important to consider job satisfaction prior to retirement
when studying the relationship between retirement and health outcomes.
3 Estimation Methods: Discontinuity Designs
This analysis uses the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS hereafter), a representative
longitudinal survey that contains employment and retirement histories for each surveyed
person as well as other information at individual and household level. We consider the
first 16 waves of the data set, corresponding to the period 1991 to 2006, and focus on the
sub-population of male individuals. In the analysis, a person was taken as a retiree if (i)
that was his self-reported job market status, (ii) he reported not to have undertaken any
paid work during the two weeks prior to the interview, and (iii) he did not re-enter the
job market after retiring, regardless of whether their subsequent job status is employed
or unemployed.
The identifying strategy followed here exploits that, during the period under con-
sideration, there was a default state pension age (for men) in the U.K. of 65, which
5Of course this argument presupposes that individuals have a good understanding of their own abil-
ities, which is a contentious assumption -though perhaps empirically testable.
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Figure 1: Discontinuities in the proportion of male retirees. The abscissa is
Age − 65. Local linear estimator with bandwidth h = cσxn−0.2, for c = 0.5, 1
and 1.5.
induces a number of peculiarities in the distribution of retirees. The estimate of this
distribution is plotted in figure 1. The average ratio of retirees at age 64 for our sample
is approximately 60% confirming the findings of previous studies6 that most people have
already retired by the time they reach the DRA. However, the first interesting feature
of the distribution is the discontinuity at age 65, where the proportion of retirees jumps
to about 85%. This discontinuity in the distribution of retirees can be exploited us-
ing regression discontinuity (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960, van der Klaauw, 1996,
Hahn et al., 2001) to obtain a first set of instrumental variables for retirement in the
health-retirement equation7. The procedure can be formalised as follows.
Let Y be an outcome of interest with conditional expected valueG(x) = E(Y |X = x).
In our case Y is health status measured, for instance, as an indicator of depression or
the average score in a general health questionnaire. X is a random variable, typically
correlated with Y , that determines allocation to treatment status -the latter represented
by T , a binary indicator taking value 1 if a person in the sample is treated, and whose
conditional expectation is P (x) = E(T |X = x). In a typical regression discontinuity
application, allocation to treatment depends on the running variable X exceeding a
threshold value xo. In our case, X denotes an individual’s age, T indicates retirement
6See, Banks and Smith (2006), Gruber and Wise (2002, 2004).
7A number of authors have exploited this type of discontinuity in the distribution of retirees, including
Battistin et al. (2009), Stancanelli and van Soest (2011), Johnston and Lee (2009), Dong (2011), to
mention but a representative few.
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status and xo = 65 ( the default retirement age). Perfect compliance with treatment
is not a requirement for successful identification -and in our case it is not satisfied8.
Using Rubin’s potential outcomes framework let Y (1) and Y (0) refer to an individual’s
outcomes with and without the treatment, only one of which is revealed in empirical
research,
Y = TY (1) + (1− T )Y (0) = α+ τT.
where τ = Y (1) − Y (0) is the treatment effect parameter. A number of sources9 show
that, if
lim
x→x+o
P (x) 6= lim
x→x−o
P (x)
then,
E(τ |X = xo) =
limx→x+o G(x)− limx→x−o G(x)
limx→x+o P (x)− limx→x−o P (x)
(3.1)
The necessary condition for identification is that E(Y (0)|X = x) and E(Y (1)|X = x)
are continuous at xo -a condition we will refer to as continuity of potential outcomes
(CPO)10. Under additional weak restrictions, Lee (2008) shows that CPO naturally leads
to quasi-randomization in small neighbourhoods to the left and right the cut-off point,
and this provides the power (and justifies the use) of regression discontinuity. Therefore,
evaluation of empirical distributions of pre-determined characteristics just above and
below xo becomes a valid check of the otherwise non-testable CPO assumption.
Estimation in RD designs in this setting admits use of Instrumental Variable (IV)
interpretation11. From a parametric point of view, for small e(n) > 0, one has the
following outcome model in (xo − e, xo + e),
Y = β0 + h(X) + τT + ε (3.2)
where the unknown h(X) can be approximated at xo by a polynomial series expansion
8Traditionally one distinguishes between designs with perfect compliance, “sharp”RD, and designs
with imperfect compliance, “fuzzy”. In this paper we are interested in the second type of design.
9See Hahn et al. (1999), Lee (2008), Angrist and Pischke (2008) or Lee and Lemieux (2010)
10Under homogeneous treatment effect the ratio in equation (3.1) identifies τ itself, and in this case
only continuity of E(Y (0)|X) is required (Hahn et al., 1999)
11Without loss of generality, in what follows we adopt a parametric approach. The equivalent nonpara-
metric take on RD designs can be found in numerous references, including Hahn et al. (1999), Angrist
and Pischke (2008) or Dong (2011).
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(Angrist and Pischke, 2008), so that12
Y = β0 + β1(X − xo) + . . .+ βp(X − xo)p + τT + ε (3.3)
where ε is uncorrelated with X by assumption. In our case, this implies that age looses
its detrimental effect on average health if we restrict attention to a group of people
whose age differs only slightly. If the probability of treatment is discontinuous at xo,
then Di = I(Xi ≥ xo) is correlated with Ti but, by hypothesis, uncorrelated with ε.
Therefore, Di stands as a valid instrument for Ti in (xo − e, xo + e) and τ can be
consistently estimated via 2SLS using Di and a polynomial in Xi as instruments.
If the discontinuity in the distribution of T given X is small, researchers face a prob-
lem of weak identification (Feir et al., 2011). It is well know that weak instruments
exacerbate the small sample bias of 2SLS estimators and will render misleading inferen-
tial procedures (Bound et al., 1995, Staiger and Stock, 1997, Feir et al., 2011, Kleibergen,
2002). However, a recent paper by Dong (2011) (see also Card et al., 2009 ), has pointed
out that, should a discontinuity in the distribution of treatment be too small, identifi-
cation of treatment effects is possible if there is a discontinuity in the first derivative of
the distribution of treatment -that is, a kink in the distribution of T given X- so that:
lim
e→0
∂P (x)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=xo+e
6= lim
e→0
∂P (x)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=xo−e
. (3.4)
The essential condition for identification is continuity in the first order partial derivatives
of potential outcomes. Dong (2011) shows that, under this assumption, it is possible to
identify treatment effects when there is a kink in the conditional distribution of T , or a
jump, or both -in which case the estimator is a weighted average of the estimator used
in RD designs and Kink designs, namely
τ =
limx→x+o G(x)− limx→x−o G(x) + wn(limx→x+o G′(x)− limx→x−o G′(x))
limx→x+o P (x)− limx→x−o P (x) + wn(limx→x+o P ′(x)− limx→x−o P ′(x))
(3.5)
for a given sequence {wn} such that limn→∞wn = 0. Continuous differentiability of po-
tential outcomes is not a directly testable assumption. Dong suggests that the adequacy
of the kink design can be tested by checking the existence of kinks and jumps in the
conditional means of pre-determined variables, although she does not provide a formal
discussion regarding the nature of these conditions. A formal analysis can be undertaken
12For convenience we abuse the notation slightly and use the same symbol for the error term in
equations (3.2) (3.3)
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drawing from Lee (2008) and Card et al. (2009), and is undertaken in the Appendix.
Looking at Figure 1 it is a priori unclear whether the jump in the discontinuity
is sufficiently large to identify the causal effect of retirement on health. However, the
figure exhibits a change in the slope after crossing default retirement age. The existence
of the kink can be confirmed by a simple OLS regression of the retirement indicator
on D = I(Xi ≥ 65), Di ∗ Xi and a fifth polynomial in Xi. The coefficient for the
interaction term in such regression was -.0568 (p = 0.000). It was mentioned above that
the retirement rate at age 64 is about 60% for a typical year and jumps to about 85% at
age 65. The increase in the proportion of retirees up to age 64 is fast, reflected in a large
positive, increasing slope of the half of the distribution to the left of xo. However, the
right half of the distribution exhibits only a moderate slope, suggesting that retirement
beyond the DRA converges slowly to 1. This feature allows us to build a second set of
instrumental variables. Dong (2011) shows that her kink design approach also admits
a local IV interpretation. Under the premises underpinning the local outcome model
in equation (3.2) and its approximation in (3.3), a kink at xo can be captured by the
interaction of D and X, in which case D and D∗X are both valid instruments to identify
τ via 2SLS using the feasible first stage equation
T = αo + α1(X − xo) + . . . αp(X − xo)p + pi1D + pi2D ∗ (X − xo) + u.
In this case, Dong (2011) shows that the estimator of τ is an empirical version of (2.6)
with weights w1 = cov(T,D), w2 = cov(T,X ∗D).
The above discontinuity designs have been developed with cross-sectional data in
mind. When repeated cross-section and panel data are available, it is a wide-spread
practice to take the average cluster approach described in Lemieux and Milligan (2008),
Battistin et al. (2009), or Dong (2011), whereby the relevant endogenous variables are
averaged within each wave and across the panel conditional on clusters of the running
variable. As noted by Lemieux and Milligan (2008), in a regression discontinuity frame-
work, the resulting estimator of the treatment effect is identical to weighted estimates of
individual wave estimators, when the weights used are the number of observations per
cell.
As pointed out by Petterson-Lidbom (forthcoming), RD relies on the cut-off value
inducing local quasi-experimental randomization, which is the strength, but also Achille’s
heel, of the method. In practice nonparametric identification requires large amounts of
data at the boundary of the threshold value, which is not always available. However
if one exploits the panel structure of the data, then estimates via fixed effects (FE),
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and first-differences (FD) draw comparisons within the same individual, making the
treatment and control groups comparable by definition, the assumption of continuous
(differentiable) potential outcomes is less contentious regardless of the sample size, thus
reducing the relevance of choosing a bandwidth. Following this rationale, we suggest the
following local outcome model,
Yit = θi + λt + τTit + β1(Xit − xo) + . . .+ βp(Xit − xo)p + εit (3.6)
Tit = θi + λt + +β1(Xit − xo) + . . .+ βp(Xit − xo)p
+ pi1Dit + pi2Dit ∗ (Xit − xo) + νit. (3.7)
where θi and λt are individual and period specific coefficients. This model can be es-
timated via first difference instrumental variables (FD-IV) on the structural equation,
with instruments described in the first stage equation. As before the unknown control
functions q(.) and r(.) are replaced by polynomial approximations in practice. To test
the validity of the instruments, we follow Staiger and Stock (1997), and calculate the
first stage test of joint significance (F test), expecting this to exceed a nominal value of
ten.
4 Empirical Analysis.
We use the discontinuity design just described to evaluate the effect of retirement on
a collection of health-related indicators which can be classified in three groups: mental
health indicators, measures of health care utilisation and design check variables13. We
describe these variables next.
In the BHPS, mental health is measured with Goldberg’s General Health Question-
naire14, GHQ-12, (Goldberg, 1978). The amount of strain and sense of a role felt by
interviewees constitute two of the domains explored by GHQ-12. Firstly, individuals are
asked if they have recently felt that they “were playing a useful part in things”. We use
this as our role-variable. We created a binary indicator taking value 1 if an individual
answered “less so”or “much less”to this question and 0 otherwise. Secondly, GHQ-12
contains the question “Have you recently felt constantly under strain?”. We adopt this
13Our analysis was broader, and we also studied the average score in Goldberg’s General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ-12), self-reported life satisfaction, and unhappiness, but each of these outcomes
appeared statistically insignificant, so we do not include them in the final set of results.
14The answers to the questionnaire are summarised in a twelve point scale that measures the inability
to carry out normal functions and the appearance of new and distressing psychological phenomena.
Large average scores denote deteriorating mental health.
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as our strain-variable. A binary indicator was created that took the value 1 if an individ-
ual answered “rather more”or “ much more”. Apart from the GHQ-12 and the role and
strain dummies, BHPS includes a binary indicator taking value 1 if a person reported
to “have any of the health problems or disabilities listed ... anxiety or depression”. This
is a more direct indicator of (self-reported) mental health, and was also included in the
analysis.
In addition to the above mental health scores, we also considered indicators of mi-
graine and high blood pressure. These can be seen a more objective indicators of general
health, but they can also proxy mental health. Medical evidence suggests that there is
a genetic association between migraine and depression (Ahn and Ashizawa, 2010, Stam
et al., 2010). The medical literature has also recently identified a correlation between
depression and high-blood pressure (Licht et al., 2008, Dawood et al., 2009). These
indicators might be directly affected by retirement or, given the result in the medical
literature, if retirement affects mental health, it is likely that these indicators will also
be affected.
Our measures of health care utilisation are a dummy variable indicating if an indi-
vidual had at least one inpatient stay in hospital during the previous year and a dummy
variable indicating if an individual visited a general practitioner during the previous year
on six or more occasions. In the typical year, the proportion of individuals in the panel
that visited a general practitioner (family doctor) three or more times over the previous
12 month period was around 40% while the proportion of individuals who visited a gen-
eral practitioner six or more times ranges between 15-20%, so the latter is a relatively
infrequent event. Note that individuals normally make appointments with their general
practitioner on their own initiative whenever they consider that medical care is required,
therefore this measure of utilization might not reflect actual medical need. Self-referral
is based on the subjective evaluation of a patient but, as we argued earlier, the number
of visits to a family doctor may simply reflect incentives faced by individuals at their
work place. On the contrary, inpatient stays require the qualified opinion of a physician,
and therefore apart from measuring utilization, this variable is a more objective proxy
of medical need and overall health status. If retirement seriously affects health in the
short run, we should observe some variation in the levels of these variables.
In order to address potential heterogeneity in the causal effect of retirement, we
undertook the analysis by education level (higher education, secondary education and
no qualifications), occupation group (white collar or manual worker) and self-reported
job satisfaction the year before retirement (whether individuals were completely satisfied
with their jobs or not).
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Following previous practice in the literature (see for example Battistin et al. (2009),
Dong (2011), Petterson-Lidbom, forthcoming) model (3.6) was estimated using four
different bandwidths, namely ±∞,±10,±8 and ±6. However it is convenient to remark
that, since we are exploiting the panel structure of the data, comparisons are drawn
at the level of the individual, so there are not major issues regarding comparability of
treatment and controls; since our design further includes a set of time dummies, any
trends are being taken care of, and therefore we expect the results to be relatively
insensitive to the choice of bandwidth.
4.1 Results.
The analysis began by assessing whether the distribution of the running variable (actual
age minus the default retirement age) exhibited any kink or jump for each year in
the panel. Following the theory given in Appendix A, any such discontinuities would
imply that our results could be confounded by variation caused by reasons other than
retirement status. Figure 2 exhibits the distribution of the running variable for three
years (1995, 2000 and 2005). It is clear from this figure that there are no obvious
discontinuities around the cut-off implied by the default retirement age, so that the first
necessary identifying condition seems to be satisfied.
To further test the validity of the design, we sought kinks or jumps in the conditional
distributions of a number of pre-determined variables, namely the proportion of individ-
uals without qualifications and the proportion of manual workers in the sample. Once
again, the theory of discontinuity designs suggests that these must not exist, otherwise
inference might be biased due to variation in factors other than treatment itself. Fig-
ures 3 and 4 represent scatter plots of the average (across the panel) number of manual
workers and people without qualifications at each age cell. The figures include local
linear estimators15 of the conditional means above and below the cut off set by the de-
fault retirement age. Neither figure suggests the existence of discontinuities around the
default retirement age. As a last evaluation, we also included as outcome variables in
our study the proportion of individuals with diabetes. In accordance with the medical
literature, diabetes is related to certain diseases and genetic endowment. There is evi-
dence, however, that Type II diabetes is related to sedentary life styles (Rise´rus et al.,
2009), and therefore, in the long-run, retirement might lead to diabetes if it conveys a
change to a less active life-style. Even then, it is unlikely that the prevalence of diabetes
increases in the short run immediately after retirement, and therefore our discontinuity
15The bandwidths were chosen as h = cσxn
−1/5, where c = 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2 and σx is the sample standard
deviation of the running variable.
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design should not reveal any variation in the prevalence of this disease in the sample.
Table 2 contains the results produced by the FD-IV estimator for a variety of groups16.
In all instances the causal effect of retirement on diabetes was not significant, as we
had expected. Therefore, we find sufficient evidence to support the robustness of the
discontinuity design.
Further evidence regarding the strength of the design is provided by the first stage
estimates collected at the bottom of Tables 3 to 7. Table 3 contains the reduced form
estimates for the whole sample. The dummy variable capturing the jump in the propor-
tion of retirees appears with a significant coefficient ranging between 15.9% and 18.0%,
which is just below the expected 20/25% jump in the proportion of retirees reported by
our descriptive analysis and previous published results (e.g. Smith (2006), Banks and
Smith (2006)). The discontinuity in the first derivative of the conditional mean, captured
by the interaction term in equation (3.7) ranges between -0.009 and -0.037, although is
only statistically significant for the larger bandwidths considered in the exercise. The
F-test for the joint significance of the set of instruments is always significant and never
below 19.1 and therefore, in accordance withStaiger and Stock (1997), weak instruments
does not appear to be a concern. The pattern observed for the whole sample stays ap-
proximately invariable when different groups of individuals are considered, although the
magnitude of the discontinuity in the distribution of retirees varies up to a maximum of
between around 40% to 45% (for the group of manual workers). However, we find that
for the groups of people with secondary and higher education, the jump in the distribu-
tion of retirees is small (10 to 16% in the secondary education group and 5 to 10% in the
higher education group), and so is the F test (which remains significant in all instances,
but can be as low a 3). In these examples, the significance of the kink in the first stage
equation is also lost, and therefore this raises some doubts about the validity of level of
schooling as a classification system to study retirement via discontinuity designs in the
BHPS.
The estimated causal effect of retirement in the outcomes of interest are collected in
Tables 3 to 7. We first focus our attention on the self reported indicators of mental health.
Table 3 shows that the causal effect of retirement on high blood pressure, migraine and
depression is statistically insignificant. This is also found in all the remaining tables, and
the finding is invariant to the choice of bandwidth. Therefore, we fail to detect a short
term effect of retirement on our indicators of mental health. The next question is whether
16We report the results for all sample, individuals with a higher education degree, those who were
completely satisfied with their jobs the year before retirement and while collar workers. The results for
the remaining groups were similar and are available from the authors upon request.
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the role and strain theories can be corroborated by our study. As with the indicators of
mental health, we do not find any statistically significant short term effect of retirement
on the GHQ’s indicators of sense of role loss and strain. Once again, the results are
invariant irrespective of the choice of bandwidth, educational and occupational groups
or the level of job satisfaction prior to retirement.
Finally we evaluate the effect of retirement on utilization of medical care. As with
the other measures, there are no significant effects of retirement on inpatient stays.
However, we do find a significant effect of retirement on the proportion of patients that
visited a GP on more than six occasions. This effect is only representative for the group
of people who reported to be completely satisfied with their jobs the year before they
took retirement. The estimated average treatment effect for this group is about -0.3,
which is approximately equal to the effect estimated in all the other groups (although
for the remaining groups the effect appears to be insignificant).
The question might arise if the lack of significance in the results presented here is due
to poor identification, in which case the design would fail to capture variation in virtually
any variable under consideration. We have already presented evidence supporting the
strength of the discontinuity design, except in the case when individuals are classified
by educational group. Nonetheless, we undertook a final check. Recent literature has
identified a substantial rise in the amount of time spent in housework upon retirement
-see, in particular, Aguiar and Hurst (2005). These authors find that individuals would
substitute time in the workplace for time cooking and other tasks, which, in the view
of Aguiar and Hurst (2005) compensates for the drop in personal expenditure, thus
explaining part of the retirement-consumption puzzle (Banks et al. (1998)). Similar
variation in housework has been detected in French data by Stancanelli and van Soest
(2011). We evaluated the effect of retirement on time spent on housework in the BHPS.
Figure 5 shows local linear regressions for the amount of time spent in housework in three
different years (1995, 2000 and 2005). The plots consistently reflect a discontinuity on the
amount of time spent in housework upon retirement. The figure suggests a jump of about
3-4 hours per week, on average. Table 9 collects the results of applying our discontinuity
designs to the variable housework. It confirms a jump of between 3 and 5 hours per
week in the amount to time devoted to housework, and the results are significant for
all bandwidths and all groups considered, except when clusters are organised around
education levels. However, given our findings regarding the weakness of the design when
individuals are classified by educational group, this is not a surprising result.
Our results seem to suggest three hypotheses. Firstly, retirement does not affect
mental health, high blood pressure or the incidence of migraine. This is in line with
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previous findings reported by Coe and Lindeboom (2008) and Neuman (2008). Our
conclusion does not depend on education attainment, the occupational classifications
or the level of job satisfaction a worker has immediately before retirement. Similarly,
we find that inpatient stays remain unaffected by retirement. Inpatient stays normally
denote an at least more-than-moderate health shock, and since referral to secondary
care needs the qualified opinion of a physician, our results seems to suggest that other
dimensions of health are not serious affected by retirement either. Despite these find-
ings, our estimates suggested that utilization of primary care might be decreased by
retirement. In particular, the proportion of people who visited a general practitioner on
more than six occasions in a give year dropped by about 30% for the group of people
who reported to be completely satisfied with their jobs prior to retirement. For the other
groups considered in the analysis we also found a drop of around the same magnitude
in this indicator, however the estimated causal effect for these groups was statistically
insignificant. Assuming that this result can be extrapolated then, if as suggested here
retirement is innocuous for health in the short run, the question arises of what could
explain any variation in utilization of primary care. The hypothesis we have presented
is that perhaps individuals have incentives to self-refer to a general practice during their
working lives. For instance, contracts might contemplate a variety of arrangements of
sick-leaves or sick-pay that might help to rationalise shirking. This is a question for
further investigation.
5 Conclusion
In this article we have explored the causal effect of retirement on health using a repre-
sentative sample of the population (the British Household Panel Survey). A number of
researchers have pointed out that if retirement affects health the valuation of policies
that prolong retirement should account for such effects, since a longer retirement horizon,
by postponing changes in health outcomes, would affect the utilization of health services
by older adults and this would impact upon medical expenditure. This notwithstanding,
numerous published evidence suggests that there are different experiences of retirement,
and therefore, any potential effect of retirement on health is likely to be heterogeneous.
We have used a new identification strategy in order to capture the local average causal
effect of retirement on a number of outcomes (namely mental health and health care
utilisation). Our strategy combines discontinuity designs with panel data. Exploiting
discontinuities in the distribution and the density functions of the proportion of retirees
conditional on age, we have constructed instrumental variables that were fed into a first-
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difference instrumental variable panel data model. Proceeding this way, we could take
into account the potential endogeneity in the treatment indicator. By exploiting the
panel structure of the data, we had the advantage that comparisons are drawn within
the same individual over time, so that the assumption of continuous differentiability of
potential outcomes typically needed for the validity of discontinuity designs becomes
much less contentious and, furthermore, the issue of selecting a bandwidth guaranteeing
homogeneity of the treatment and control groups becomes also less fundamental. Our
results suggest that the local average treatment effect of retirement on mental health is
largely insignificant thus supporting previous evidence in Neuman (2008) and Coe and
Lindeboom (2008) who suggests that this relationship is merely nominal. The effect of
retirement on inpatient stays also appears to be insignificant.
We found some evidence suggesting that utilization of primary care might be de-
creased by retirement. In particular, the proportion of people who visited a general
practitioner on more than six occasions in a give year dropped by around 30% for the
group of people who reported to be completely satisfied with their jobs prior to retire-
ment. For the other groups considered in the analysis we also found a drop in this
indicator, however the estimated causal effect for these groups was statistically insignif-
icant. We are not aware of similar results in the literature, so this specific finding needs
further exploration to confirm its external validity. If retirement reduces the consump-
tion of primary care, as our results suggest, then postponing the age of retirement might
preclude the realisation of this benefit. Yet the gains derived from later retirement pat-
terns are likely to more than compensate for that loss. However, the question of why
the consumption of primary care might decrease upon retirement would maintain its
interest. Given our results that suggest that retirement does not affect mental health
or inpatient stays (and thus the prevalence of very severe health conditions), the drop
in utilization of primary care must be due to external factors. One potential reason
for this could be incentives faced by workers prior to retirement that might promote
absenteeism, part of which can be rationalised through consumption of medical care.
Statutory or occupational sick leave and sick pay can create this type of incentive when
the monitoring of absenteeism is not too strict. Even in firms tightly monitor the health
and health care use of their employees, or efficiency wages are paid once the decision
of retirement has been taken the consequences of getting caught shirking might become
mild or disappear altogether. Unfortunately, our data set does not provide sufficient
information to explore this question further.
In common with most empirical work, one potential issue with our analysis is that it
only considers average treatment effects. However, it is the overall distribution of health
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that is of interest for the policy maker because the average health status might remain
constant over time, even when radical changes might be occurring in the distribution of
health. To explore this, however, requires estimating distributional effects, and we leave
this for future research.
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A Appendix
Continuous differentiability of potential outcomes is a necessary condition for the validity
of the kink design. However, this is not a directly testable assumption. Dong suggests
that the adequacy of the kink design can be tested by checking the existence of kinks
and jumps in the conditional means of pre-determined variables, although she does
not provide a formal explanation. We provide next a formal analysis of this condition,
borrowing from Lee (2008) and Card et al. (2009). Let us introduce the following general
scenario.
Assumption 1. (i) (X,W ) are random variables (only X is observable). The c.d.f. of
W is denoted by G(w). (ii) The conditional distribution of X given W , F (x|w),
is twice continuously differentiable at xo for all w. (iii) The conditional density
f(xo|w) > 0 in A, where
∫
A dG(w) > 0.
Assumption 2. Y (0) = yo(X,W ), Y (1) = y1(X,W ), where yo, y1 are real-valued and
continuously differentiable at the cut-off, xo. Finally Z (any pre-determined and
observable variable) is such that Z = z(W ).
Assumption 3. βi = Yi(0) − Yi(1) is such that τ = E(βi|Xi = x) is continuous dif-
ferentiable at xo, and X is independent if βi conditional on X near xo, for all
w.
As in Lee (2008), W is the unobservable type of an individual -which we assume to be,
without loss of generality, a single random variable. Identical individuals will share the
same value of W . Assumption 1.ii implies that for each individual, the probability of
obtaining an X just below and just above 0 are the same and that, in a neighbourhood
about xo, changes in this probability occur smoothly. The latter is not a requirement
for identification in RD designs. By requiring f(xo|w) > 0 we are ruling out situations
when individuals can precisely manipulate their X score, what would invalidate the
design. Assumption 2 allows outcome to vary with X directly, and not only indirectly
through treatment status. Finally, Assumption 3 is required because we are assuming
heterogeneous treatment effects. The condition is identical to that in Hahn et al. (1999)
for RD designs. In the case of constant treatment effect is can be done without.
For an arbitrary function H(x) denote limx→x+o H
′(x) = lime→0 ∂H(x)/∂x|x=xo+e.
Given all three conditions, we can introduce the following result.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 to 4, (i) F (W ≤ w|X = x) is continuously dif-
ferentiable at xo, (ii) F (Z ≤ z|X = x) is continuously differentiable at xo for any
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predetermined variable Z, and (iii)
τ =
limx→x+o G
′(x)− limx→x−o G′(x)
limx→x+o P
′(x)− limx→x−o P ′(x)
(A-1)
This result is proved in the appendix. The key innovation of the proposition is result
(ii). Dong (2011) establishes that identification in kink designs requires continuous
differentiability of potential outcomes. But this is an untestable assumption. Result (ii)
in the proposition establishes a way to verify the validity of the kink design by evaluating
that the conditional c.d.f of observable pre-determined variables do not exhibit jumps
or kinks about the threshold value xo. If these exist, the it is unlikely that outcomes
will be continuously differentiable. The proof of (i) and (ii) can be found in Card et al.
(2009). To prove (iii) note that f Yi = αi + βiTi, where αi = Y (0), βi = Yi(1) − Yi(0).
Then,
E(Yi|X = xo + e) = E(αi|X = xo + e) + E(βiTi|Xi = xo + e)
= E(αi|X = xo + e)
+ E(βi|Xi = xo + e)E(Ti|Xi = xo + e), (A-2)
under conditional independence. Differentiating with respect to x and taking limits, we
have
∂
∂x
E(Yi|X = xo + e) = ∂
∂x
E(αi|X = xo + e)
+
∂
∂x
E(βi|Xi = xo + e)E(Ti|Xi = xo + e)
=
∫
∂yo(w, v)
∂x
f(x|w)
f(x)
dF (w)
+
∫
yo(w, v)
∂
∂x
(
f(x|w)
f(x)
)
dF (w)
+
∂E(βi|X = xo + e)
∂x
E(Ti|X = xo + e)
+ E(βi|X = xo + e)∂E(Ti|X = xo + e)
∂x
(A-3)
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A similar result follows for ∂∂xE(Yi|X = xo − e). Taking limits as e→ 0, it follows that,
lim
e→0
∂
∂x
E(Yi|X = xo + e)− lim
e→0
∂
∂x
E(Yi|X = xo − e)
= E(βi|X = xo + e) lim
e→0
(
∂E(Ti|X = xo + e)
∂x
− ∂E(Ti|X = xo − e)
∂x
)
(A-4)
because of the continuous differentiability of potential outcomes and f(v|w) and the
continuity of E(βi|X) at xo.
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Table 1: Proportion of Retirees by occupation, education and job satisfaction
(488 retirements in total).
Education.
N %
No qualifications: 142 29.1 %
University degree: 185 37.91%
Occupation.
N %
Manual workers: 156 31.97%
White collar: 149 30.5%
Job satisfaction
N %
Completely satisfied: 216 44.0%
0
0.005
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0.015
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0.025
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1995
2000
2005
Figure 2: Density function of the running (age) variable for years 1995, 2000
and 2005.
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Table 2: Local A.T.E. Diabetes
(1) h10 h8 h6
All Sample 0.005 0.027 0.040 0.020
(0.820) (0.468) (0.313) (0.602)
Tot. Satisfied −0.016 −0.019 −0.020 −0.024
(0.390) (0.397) (0.418) (0.361)
White collar −0.043 0.004 0.011 0.011
(0.339) (0.886) (0.759) (0.756)
Higher education −0.017 −0.055 0.089 0.025
(0.748) (0.626) (0.487) (0.815)
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05
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Figure 3: Discontinuities in the proportion of manual workers. The abscissa is
Age−65. Local linear estimator with bandwidth h = cσxn−0.2, for c = 0.5, 1, 1.5
and 2.
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Table 3: Local A.T.E., all sample
(1) h10 h8 h6
High blood pressure −0.034 −0.024 −0.047 −0.068
(0.596) (0.816) (0.667) (0.532)
Depression/Anxiety 0.000 0.020 0.033 0.037
(1.000) (0.735) (0.591) (0.547)
Migraine 0.001 0.005 0.046 0.038
(0.982) (0.918) (0.407) (0.480)
GHQ-12 0.044 0.357 0.467 0.291
(0.947) (0.585) (0.497) (0.661)
Role −0.090 −0.050 −0.014 −0.017
(0.296) (0.614) (0.894) (0.871)
Strain −0.014 −0.020 0.031 0.000
(0.904) (0.856) (0.786) (0.999)
Inpatient 0.051 0.091 0.105 0.154
(0.499) (0.392) (0.347) (0.166)
G.P. Often −0.154 −0.194 −0.275∗ −0.252∗
(0.053) (0.096) (0.026) (0.039)
First Stage
Dummy 0.165∗ 0.159∗ 0.180∗ 0.165∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interaction −0.037∗ −0.009∗ −0.027 −0.013
(0.000) (0.000) (0.065) (0.543)
F test 136.330∗ 28.250∗ 24.880∗ 19.910∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05
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Table 4: Local A.T.E., manual workers
(1) h10 h8 h6
High blood pressure −0.113∗ −0.105 −0.126 −0.122
(0.024) (0.222) (0.168) (0.188)
Depression −0.059 −0.033 −0.042 −0.052
(0.152) (0.527) (0.427) (0.311)
Diabetes 0.037∗ 0.004 0.011 0.011
(0.006) (0.886) (0.759) (0.756)
Inpatient 0.010 0.108 0.123 0.166
(0.882) (0.232) (0.215) (0.110)
Migraine 0.037 0.005 0.027 0.011
(0.383) (0.915) (0.528) (0.785)
Role −0.039 0.052 0.080 0.048
(0.606) (0.539) (0.359) (0.600)
GHQ-12 0.472 0.641 0.714 0.533
(0.422) (0.290) (0.244) (0.388)
Strain 0.037 0.091 0.095 0.055
(0.716) (0.344) (0.310) (0.546)
GP Often −0.037 −0.071 −0.089 −0.049
(0.625) (0.507) (0.422) (0.671)
First Stage
Dummy 0.425∗ 0.438∗ 0.445∗ 0.408∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interaction −0.214∗ −0.041 −0.030 −0.066
(0.005) (0.283) (0.536) (0.337)
F test 113.950∗ 16.250∗ 13.990∗ 11.120∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05
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Table 5: Local A.T.E., no qualifications
(1) h10 h8 h6
High blood pressure −0.129 −0.146 −0.182 −0.140
(0.174) (0.214) (0.142) (0.262)
Depression 0.031 0.037 0.044 0.030
(0.593) (0.581) (0.526) (0.670)
Diabetes 0.037 0.046 0.039 0.024
(0.313) (0.317) (0.446) (0.644)
Inpatient 0.131 0.148 0.161 0.150
(0.184) (0.203) (0.195) (0.239)
Migraine 0.027 0.014 0.046 0.042
(0.576) (0.819) (0.465) (0.517)
Role 0.009 0.033 0.083 0.067
(0.933) (0.771) (0.488) (0.582)
GHQ-12 0.015 0.272 0.421 −0.095
(0.982) (0.707) (0.584) (0.904)
Strain −0.001 0.037 0.045 0.011
(0.994) (0.743) (0.701) (0.924)
GP Often −0.065 −0.119 −0.171 −0.159
(0.552) (0.370) (0.225) (0.266)
First Stage
Dummy 0.265∗ 0.226∗ 0.233∗ 0.195∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interaction −0.044∗ −0.070∗ −0.054∗ −0.107∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.004)
F test 58.990∗ 27.670∗ 23.640∗ 18.360∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05
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Table 6: Local A.T.E., Higher Education
(1) h10 h8 h6
High blood pressure 0.101 0.073 −0.005 −0.105
(0.581) (0.853) (0.989) (0.788)
Depression 0.053 0.179 0.116 0.080
(0.722) (0.421) (0.604) (0.716)
Inpatient −0.008 0.205 0.452 0.342
(0.971) (0.605) (0.288) (0.388)
Migraine −0.122 −0.117 −0.099 −0.193
(0.412) (0.564) (0.636) (0.298)
Role −0.108 0.049 −0.295 −0.300
(0.705) (0.896) (0.452) (0.420)
GHQ-12 0.883 2.416 0.472 0.917
(0.694) (0.340) (0.842) (0.672)
Strain 0.077 0.081 −0.043 −0.257
(0.851) (0.858) (0.925) (0.544)
GP Often −0.355 −0.451 −0.423 −0.247
(0.140) (0.302) (0.349) (0.554)
First Stage
Dummy 0.056∗ 0.067∗ 0.091∗ 0.102∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interaction −0.039∗ 0.016 0.053∗ 0.075∗
(0.000) (0.415) (0.033) (0.004)
F test 29.200∗ 3.090∗ 3.000∗ 2.800∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05
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Table 7: Local A.T.E., white collar
(1) h10 h8 h6
High blood pressure −0.153 −0.105 −0.126 −0.122
(0.290) (0.222) (0.168) (0.188)
Depression −0.071 −0.033 −0.042 −0.052
(0.562) (0.527) (0.427) (0.311)
Inpatient 0.070 0.108 0.123 0.166
(0.712) (0.232) (0.215) (0.110)
Migraine 0.016 0.005 0.027 0.011
(0.897) (0.915) (0.528) (0.785)
Role −0.082 0.052 0.080 0.048
(0.740) (0.539) (0.359) (0.600)
GHQ-12 −0.410 0.641 0.714 0.533
(0.832) (0.290) (0.244) (0.388)
Strain −0.210 0.091 0.095 0.055
(0.568) (0.344) (0.310) (0.546)
GP Often −0.057 −0.071 −0.089 −0.049
(0.772) (0.507) (0.422) (0.671)
First Stage
Dummy 0.117∗ 0.438∗ 0.445∗ 0.408∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interaction −0.024∗ −0.041 −0.030 −0.066
(0.001) (0.283) (0.536) (0.337)
F test 40.180∗ 16.250∗ 13.990∗ 11.120∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05
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Table 8: Local A.T.E., completely Satisfied with job
(1) h10 h8 h6
High Blood Pressure 0.025 0.032 0.048 0.097
( 0.805) ( 0.778) ( 0.675) ( 0.374)
Depression 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.041
( 0.269) ( 0.198) ( 0.224) ( 0.361)
Happy −0.191 −0.223 −0.270 −0.290
( 0.271) ( 0.176) ( 0.087) ( 0.060)
Inpatient 0.031 0.014 0.053 0.068
( 0.788) ( 0.905) ( 0.662) ( 0.564)
Migraine 0.049 0.045 0.044 0.032
( 0.390) ( 0.414) ( 0.380) ( 0.433)
Role 0.136 0.131 0.150 0.129
( 0.209) ( 0.232) ( 0.181) ( 0.241)
GHQ-12 1.244 1.228 1.307 1.207
( 0.081) ( 0.074) ( 0.067) ( 0.079)
Strain 0.123 0.105 0.140 0.143
( 0.347) ( 0.390) ( 0.238) ( 0.201)
GP Often −0.344∗ −0.357∗ −0.333∗ −0.273∗
( 0.006) ( 0.008) ( 0.015) ( 0.043)
First Stage
Dummy 0.362∗ 0.361∗ 0.395∗ 0.330∗
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
Interaction −0.067 −0.054 0.000 −0.085
( 0.060) ( 0.308) ( 0.994) ( 0.335)
F test 12.020∗ 9.010∗ 8.630∗ 7.260∗
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05
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Table 9: Local A.T.E. Housework
(1) h10 h8 h6
All Sample 3.182∗ 3.327∗ 3.898∗ 5.079∗
(0.013) (0.049) (0.030) (0.004)
Tot. Satisfied 4.810∗ 4.925∗ 4.819∗ 5.628∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
White collar 8.014∗ 4.657∗ 3.991∗ 3.714∗
(0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.017)
University degre 5.511 5.301 6.138 6.191
(0.144) (0.341) (0.296) (0.281)
p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05
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Figure 4: Discontinuities in the proportion of individuals with no qualifi-
cations. The abscissa is Age − 65. Local linear estimator with bandwidth
h = cσxn
−0.2, for c = 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2.
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Figure 5: Discontinuities in the amount of time spent in housework (local
linear regression), years 1995, 2000 and 2005. The abscissa is Age− 65.
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